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“Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions 
for people to be healthy.”2  In the abstract, the vast majority of Americans believe in 
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public health and support public health goals.3  More than three and a half decades 
ago, this attitude prompted Congress to establish “a separate standard for coverage of 
children within Medicaid” in order to facilitate baby well-care.4  However, despite 
occasional preventive measures such as this, in reality, public health has been an 
orphan in the United States for quite some time.  Much of this is due to America’s 
reliance on the sickness model of health, which emphasizes reactive, individual 
medicine as opposed to prevention in the aggregate.  Absent some emergency or 
visible health threat, the American public has been quite complacent in its support of 
preventative public health, whose positive effects, unlike those of curative medicine, 
are largely invisible.5 
This complacency, which began to wane as recent threats of anti-microbial 
resistance and the West Nile virus emerged, came to a screeching halt in 2001, with 
the events of September 11th and the anthrax scare.6  These events have catapulted 
public health to the forefront of homeland security,7 and have signaled a definite 
policy shift toward preparedness.8  As public health preparedness becomes an 
increasingly prominent issue on the political landscape, “the balance between public 
health and civil liberties, which in recent decades had been tilting more toward 
individual freedom, may be about to swing back.”9  While the tension of “freedom 
removed for future freedom retained”10 has been a timeless struggle in the history of 
democracy, the modern trend toward questioning authority figures in medicine and 
government has prompted a heightened awareness of the restrictions on civil liberties 
                                                          
2LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 13 (University of 
California Press 2000) [hereinafter “POWER”] (citing INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH 58 (1988)). 
3Barry S. Levy, Twenty-First Century Challenges for Law and Public Health, 32 IND. L. 
REV. 1149, 1150 (1999). 
4Elizabeth J. Jameson & Elizabeth Wehr, Drafting National Health Care Reform 
Legislation to Protect the Health Interests of Children, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 152, 152 
(1993). 
5Levy, supra note 3, at 1150. 
6David P. Fidler, Lawrence O. Gostin’s Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 1 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 303, 303 (2001) (book review) [hereinafter “Review”]. 
7Eleanor D. Kinney, Administrative Law and the Public’s Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
212, 212 (2002).  “The perpetration of bio-terrorism in the United States in 2001 has been 
singularly important in raising awareness about the national and global importance of public 
health.” David P. Fidler, Introduction to Written Symposium on Public Health and 
International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002) [hereinafter “Written Symposium”]. 
8David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 7, 
10 (2002) [hereinafter “Public Health”]. 
9Liz Marlantes, Bioterror: All the Rules Change, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 17, 2001, 
at 1.  I think we may have already seen some of this pendulum swing with the 2004 
presidential election.  Homeland security, as an offshoot of terrorism, was among the issues of 
most concern in the election. See Steven Thomma & Knight Ridder, Americans Differ on 
Whether President Bush Has a Mandate, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 14, 2004, at 1. 
10Carolyn D. Amadon et al., The Erosion of Constitutional Rights in the Wake of 9/11, 17-
MAR CBA REC. 24 (2003). 
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that an effective public health system might require, and an increased willingness to 
challenge the propriety of these trade-offs.11 
This article explores the tensions between creating an effective public health 
system that would be able to respond to and protect against any public health threat, 
and protecting individuals against unnecessary intrusions on their civil liberties.  It 
then considers approaches to this issue that might best strike a balance in a 
democratic society.  While many Americans may recognize and even accept that 
greater security would entail some intrusion into individual rights, there is no 
formula for striking the appropriate balance.  This article attempts to arrive at a 
workable framework by examining how the United States’ public health system 
works.  This includes reviewing its policy response to several recent public health 
threats, exposing the shortcomings of the current system, and comparing it to the 
approach of other democratic and non-democratic societies.  Based upon this review 
and analysis, the article suggests an approach that might best incorporate effective 
techniques from a variety of alternative systems, while addressing some of the main 
problems of the current framework.  This analysis is broken down into seven main 
parts. 
Part I provides an introduction to public health and the essential components of 
an effective system.  It explains why public health historically has not been high on 
the priority list of medical approaches to combating disease, and describes how this 
view of public health has evolved, particularly in recent years.  Part II examines 
some of the shortcomings of the United States’ public health system as it currently 
stands. 
Part III introduces the central controversy between civil liberties and a strong 
public health system by focusing on three of the most commonly used tools of public 
health authorities, namely: quarantines, mandatory screening and immunization, and 
health information sharing, as well as their effects on liberty and freedom of 
movement, individual autonomy, and privacy.  Part IV builds on this analysis and 
explores how the United States historically has struck a balance between these 
competing considerations by examining orders and legislation arising out of recent 
public health threats such as AIDS, SARS, and 9/11. 
Part V investigates other approaches to resolving the tensions between public 
health and civil liberties by reviewing the approach advocated by one renown public 
health expert, Lawrence Gostin, and the response of Canadian and Singaporean 
societies to the threat of SARS.  Part VI continues to explore alternatives, focusing 
solely on the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (“MSEHPA”), developed 
in response to 9/11.  Finally, Part VII identifies the shortcomings of MSEHPA and 
recommends amendments to MSEHPA that might help to strike a better balance for 
the American people.  Addressing the criticisms and concerns voiced by the 
American public is an essential step toward creating a viable, stronger public health 
system going forward. 
                                                                
11
“Governmental power and emergency measures that people may have found necessary 
and acceptable during the plague years of the First World War are no longer easily supported 
by a citizenry sensitized to civil rights by the change in our culture that transpired during the 
last half of the Twentieth Century.” Deborah L. Erickson et al., The Power to Act: Two Model 
State Statutes, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 57, 62 (2002). 
176 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 18:173 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Public health differs from traditional health care in several respects.  Some of its 
distinguishing features include a focus on: “(1) the health and safety of populations 
rather than . . . individual patients; (2) [the] prevention of injury and disease rather 
than treatment[;] . . . (3) [the] relationship between government and the community 
rather than physician and patient; and (4) services grounded on [sic] . . . scientific 
methodologies of public health (e.g. . . . epidemiology) rather than personal medical 
services.”12  The Institute of Medicine’s definition of public health, set forth at the 
beginning of this article,13 reinforces these distinguishing characteristics by 
emphasizing a mutuality of obligation lying with the government and community as 
a whole, and focusing on increasing the incidence of conditions that facilitate healthy 
living as opposed to guaranteeing health itself.14  People often fail to appreciate the 
benefits of public health, because the effects of prevention are usually invisible.  
However, a strong public health system is essential to the welfare of any society, and 
has accounted for approximately “twenty-five of the thirty years of increased life 
expectancy in the United States since the turn of the century.”15  The importance of 
public health to American society has been underscored by the events of September 
11th, which confirmed that terrorist attacks, with the potential for biological warfare, 
are very real threats.16 
In order to deal with catastrophes like this effectively, a public health system 
would have to, at a minimum, clearly articulate its objectives, and make their 
realization as consistent as possible with the public mores of the American people.17  
It is essential to the American public that its values and priorities are reflected in the 
system.18  “A ‘shared understanding’ of public health’s goals [would be essential] to 
                                                                
12Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: A Renaissance, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 136, 
136 (2002) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Renaissance”]. 
13
“Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for 
people to be healthy.” POWER, supra note 2, at 13. 
14Lawrence O. Gostin, Conceptualizing the Field After September 11th: Foreword to a 
Symposium on Public Health Law, 90 KY. L.J. 791, 794-95 (2002) [hereinafter “September 
11th”]. 
15Levy, supra note 3, at 1150.  Other things that have been positively impacted by public 
health include cleaner drinking water, more nutritious meals, safer workplaces, and less 
polluting vehicles. Id. at 1140. 
16Carol M. Ostrom, Bioterrorism Scare Here Adds Urgency to Conference: National 
Experts Discuss Coordination, Legal Rights, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at B1. 
17See James F. Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 170, 172 (2002). 
18This can be accomplished in more than one fashion.  A public health system can be 
developed according to what is known of society’s values.  The sharp division in social values 
between the more liberal and more conservative factions in the United States at the present 
time, however, makes this a difficult task.  In the alternative, since some of these values are 
contradictory and may lead to an ineffective system, getting the public’s support for a system 
may require some more adroit advertising. 
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avoiding ‘mass pandemonium.’”19  Likewise, public health, by its very nature, 
requires an investment in and support of preparedness.20 
Historically, however, public health has not been high on the priority list of 
medical interventions for the American people.  As a field of legal analysis, for 
example, it has largely been ignored due to its “broad, diffuse scope and immense 
complexity.”21  Moreover, the American public tends to be results-oriented in its 
view of medical care, valuing tangibility and immediacy of consequences over 
prevention, and, therefore, has focused on a sickness model of medicine that favors 
curative medicine rather than prevention.  As a result, resources are 
disproportionately allocated to support the former endeavor.  
These conditions have led to a situation where there seems to be a “‘virtually 
bottomless purse for treating illness’ by medical means and [only a] paucity of public 
provisions to prevent it or ensure the conditions for which people can be healthy.”22  
The reason for this disparity is tied to the public’s perception of need.   
[I]n the absence of real or perceived crises, most media and public 
attention tends to focus considerably more on the individual flesh-and-
blood stories of medical care than on public health topics that concern ‘the 
commons,’ such as health promotion and disease prevention, to which it is 
generally difficult to attach specific faces.23 
Therefore, while most people have historically supported a high level of public 
health, at least in the abstract, “fewer [have been] eager to pay for it, and many [have 
been] positively opposed to changing their own activities to promote it.”24  Until 
now. 
Although the pendulum has swung quite heavily in favor of individual rights in 
recent decades,25 “[m]any Americans have come to rethink the role of government 
and the importance of the public health safety system.”26  September 11th and the 
                                                                
19Ostrom, supra note 16. 
20
“[P]revention through preparation is essential.” James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism Law 
and Policy: Critical Choices in Public Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 254, 254 (2002). 
21Review, supra note 6, at 304. 
22Bernard M. Dickens, A Tool For Teaching and Scholarship: A Review of Lawrence 
Gostin’s Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 162, 168 (2002) 
(book review). 
23Marshall B. Kapp, Lawrence Gostin’s Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 22 J. 
LEGAL MED. 581, 581 (2001) (book review). 
24Dickens, supra note 22, at 168. 
25The HIV epidemic has sharpened the timeless tension between public health and civil 
liberties, and “[t]o many, . . . the pendulum has swung decidedly in favor of civil liberties” in 
recent decades. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The “Names Debate”: The Case 
for National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 682 (1998) [hereinafter 
“Names Debate”]. 
26September 11th, supra note 14, at 793.  With respect to confidence in government, a poll 
of ninety-nine Americans taken after 9/11 indicated that approximately fifty-eight percent 
either had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the United States government’s ability to 
protect its citizens from future terrorist attacks, while only ten had very little.  Similarly, 
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subsequent anthrax scare have illustrated the importance of rapidly detecting and 
reacting to the threats of bio-terrorism and infectious disease.27  Even more 
significantly, these disasters have made it clear that individuals acting alone cannot 
effectively protect against many public health threats to their well-being.28 
Accordingly, “[i]n the aftermath of anthrax [and 9/11] . . . [w]e may witness a 
shift from a weak national commitment to public health to a strong effort on 
homeland security, in which public health plays an important part.”29  There seems to 
be a renewed enthusiasm for preparedness and a greater support for governmental 
efforts to safeguard security.  American attitudes concerning public health have 
already been evolving.  One of the best indicators of the public’s stance on any issue 
is political action.30  Since 9/11, legislators in Washington DC have illustrated their 
dedication to the cause of public health as a matter of national security by passing 
several bio-terrorism bills.31  Among these is the Public Health Threats and 
Emergencies Act, which set aside over $500 million for bio-terrorism preparedness 
in 2001.32  Even on the state level, public health values, such as individual freedom 
yielding to the public good,33 are being increasingly reflected in legislation.34  Public 
                                                          
ninety-one of one-hundred-and-one believed the government could protect the liberties of 
Americans while ten thought it could not. See Blendon, NPR/Kaiser Family 
Foundation/Kennedy School of Government Civil Liberties, at http://www.npr.org/programs 
/specials/poll/civil_liberties/ civil _liberties_ static_ results_2.html [hereinafter “Blendon”].  
With respect to feelings about public health, a RobertWood Johnson Foundation national 
survey conducted October 20-30, 2002 found that three-fourths of Americans are concerned 
about the strain on America’s public health system, and most support increasing federal 
funding for public health, even through higher taxes. RobertWood Johnson Foundation, How 
Public Health has Changed Since 9-11, at http://www.rwjf.org/portofolios/features/feature 
detail.jsp?featureID=50&type=3&iaid=141 (last visited Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter 
“RobertWood”]. 
27September 11th, supra note 14, at 792.  “A recent national poll suggests that 70 percent 
of the public believes a subsequent biological or chemical attack on the United States will 
occur in the next year.” Hodge, supra note 20, at 256. 
28September 11th, supra note 14, at 793. 
29Public Health, supra note 8, at 23. 
30While some political action is admittedly prompted by intense pressure from a small but 
notable group of influential members of the public, my less cynical belief is that much 
political action is still an outgrowth of widespread public opinion and insistence. 
31Public Health, supra note 8, at 11.  “On January 10, 2002, President Bush signed into 
law a $2.9 billion bioterrorism appropriations bill.” Id. 
32Hodge, supra note 20, at 254. 
3320 N.Y. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 215 (2003). 
34Many states are considering and adopting variations of the Model State Emergency 
Health Powers Act, which is described infra Part VI.  “For the first time in a half-century, 
authorities are considering the legality and practicality of extreme measures, such as requiring 
the public to be tested for diseases or seizing property.” Marlantes, supra note 9. 
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health and the seemingly necessary intrusion on civil liberties may slowly be 
climbing the ladder of prominence in the lives of the American people.35 
II.  WEAKNESSES OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 
With renewed attention being focused on public health, it is becoming 
increasingly clearer that the United States’ system, as it currently stands, needs more 
than tweaking; it needs an entirely new conceptual foundation.  The first major 
problem with the public health system in the United States is one of capacity.  For 
example, in Washington, the Board of Health found that only thirty percent of its 
counties had isolation protocols in place in their hospitals, and even fewer had self-
contained air systems sufficient to isolate contagious patients.36  As a whole, “[s]tate 
and local agencies [across the United States] have inadequate and incomplete 
surveillance capacity, antiquated data systems, technologically inferior laboratories, 
and an under-trained, under-qualified workforce.”37  Much of these “glaring 
deficiencies in the public health infrastructure”38 are due to grossly inadequate 
funding and a lack of strong public support for the cause, which, according to 
respected surveys,39 is only now beginning to change.40 
The second major problem with the public health infrastructure in the United 
States is legal.  Lawrence Gostin has identified three main problems with public 
health laws as a whole, namely: (1) antiquity, (2) multiple layers of law, and (3) 
inconsistency among the states and territories.41 
A.  Problem of Antiquity 
Much of public health law was enacted in the late nineteenth and early to mid-
twentieth century, predating significant advancements in scientific understanding and 
constitutional law.42  As a result, “[t]hese laws often do not reflect contemporary 
scientific understandings of injury and disease . . . or legal norms for protection of 
individual rights.”43  Instead, today’s public health laws reflect a mindset that 
existed, in some cases, one hundred years earlier.  For example, many state 
quarantine laws do not afford individuals any sort of due process, whether in the 
                                                                
35Americans are generally notably concerned that the public health system provide 
preventive measures like immunizations, health education, and chronic disease prevention.  
“[A]t least seven in 10 people say that each of these is a very important activity.” See 
RobertWood, supra note 26. 
36Ostrom, supra note 16. 
37September 11th, supra note 14, at 796. 
38Id. 
39See, e.g., RobertWood, supra note 26. 
40September 11th, supra note 14, at 796.  “Before the recent infusion of federal funds, the 
government allocated only approximately one percent of all health dollars to traditional public 
health services.” Id. at 797.  See RobertWood, supra note 26. 
41See POWER, supra note 2, at 317-19. 
42Id. at 317. 
43Renaissance, supra note 12, at 137. 
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form of a right to challenge a governmental action, or a hearing, for the deprivation 
of liberty associated with quarantines.44 
B.  Problem of Multiple Layers of Law 
While most public health laws have not undergone substantial revision since their 
enactment, they have been amended over the years to respond to specific health 
threats.45  This piecemeal legislation has created a system where public health 
officials are accorded different levels of authority according to varying scales of 
criteria that change with the type of disease.46  This disparate structure creates 
confusion in the understanding and application of the law to contemporary health 
threats.47  Additionally, it leads to occasionally absurd results, such as a 
Massachusetts law maintaining the penalty for resisting a quarantine order at ten 
dollars.48 
C.  Problem of Inconsistency 
“Public health laws remain fragmented not only within states but among them.”49  
Each of the states’ health codes has evolved independently; accordingly, they exhibit 
profound variations among them, both in structure and in substance.50  Since state 
borders are artificial boundaries when it comes to disease, these differences become 
problematic when trying to launch a coordinated response to a widespread threat. 
D.  Problem of Lack of Authority 
Finally, many of the state officials who have been charged with scrutinizing 
public health laws across the nation in an effort to better prepare their states for the 
future have cited a fourth, more fundamental legal obstacle to a stronger public 
health system.  They argue that even a nationally coordinated response would be 
insufficient to develop an effective public health system because there is a 
fundamental “lack [of] adequate authority to combat a major bio-terror event.”51  
Due to its civil liberties implications, it is this issue, more than any other, which has 
engendered controversy in the search for a more effective system.52  This article will 
                                                                
44Ceci Connolly, Bush Smallpox Inoculation Plan Near Standstill: Medical Professionals 
Cite Possible Side Effects, Uncertainty of Threat, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 24, 2003, at A06, 
available at http://www.Washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=Feb23 
&notFound=true (last visited Dec. 19, 2005). 
45See Renaissance, supra note 12, at 137. 
46See POWER, supra note 2, at 318. 
47Id. at 319. 
48Marlantes, supra note 9. 
49POWER, supra note 2, at 319. 
50Id. 
51Marlantes, supra note 9.  This lack of authority is due to a multitude of factors, which 
include, among other things, federalism and overly burdensome privacy statutes. 
52Another controversial aspect, which is more practical than legal, is cost.  After all, 
creating a more effective public health system costs money, and people do not like to give 
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focus on the tension between greater authority and the necessary intrusion into civil 
liberties that it occasions. 
III.  PUBLIC HEALTH VS. CIVIL LIBERTIES TENSIONS 
Adequately addressing the identified weaknesses of the United States’ public 
health system will involve some friction with individual rights.53  For example 
affording public health officials an expansion of authority, will, of necessity, intrude 
on the protection of civil liberties.  More governmental power almost invariably 
corresponds to less individual liberty; “[i]t is not a new equation.”54  Likewise, some 
of the most popular and commonly used public health measures around the world—
namely quarantines, mandatory screening and immunization, and health information 
sharing—all intrude upon civil liberties to one extent or another. 
Notwithstanding the utility of these tools, and despite their potential value to 
rebuilding our nation’s public health system, “the shaping of public health policy and 
practice should never occur without careful consideration of the burden such policies 
would have for the rights of individuals.”55  In order to fully understand the 
implications of the tensions between public health measures and civil liberties, which 
some are calling the greatest dilemma now facing the nation,56 it is useful to take a 
closer look at each of the following three responses, (1) quarantines, (2) mandatory 
screening and immunization, and (3) health information sharing, individually, in 
order to balance their usefulness against the burdens they impose.  Only then can 
their place in modern United States’ policy be assessed. 
A.  Quarantines 
The modern definition of quarantine is “[a] restriction of the activities of healthy 
persons who have been exposed to a communicable disease, during its period of 
communicability, to prevent disease transmission during the incubation period if 
infection should occur.”57  The quarantine, as a tool of public health, has a long 
history dating all the way back to the Bible’s Leviticus 13,58 which discusses 
                                                          
money to government programs without seeing results.  As mentioned earlier in this paper, see 
infra page 1, the results of prevention are often invisible. 
53Even New York’s jurisprudence acknowledges that “[t]he right to preserve the public 
health, to protect the public morals, and to provide for the public safety, may interfere to some 
extent with both liberty and property.” 20 N.Y. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 207 (2003). 
54Amadon et al., supra note 10. 
55Ronald Bayer, Tom Stoddard, Public Health, and Civil Liberties: A Remembrance, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1034, 1036 (1997).  This is important not just because it is the right thing to 
do, but because the public’s buy-in is essential. 
56See Marlantes, supra note 9. 
57POWER, supra note 2, at 210 (emphasis added).  Compare the definition of quarantine to 
that of isolation, which is “the separation, for the period of communicability, of known 
infected persons in such places and under such conditions as to prevent or limit the 
transmission of the infectious agent.” Id. (emphasis added).  The distinction between the two 
is frequently not recognized, leading many to use the terms interchangeably. 
58Declan McCullagh, Something’s in the Air: Liberties in the Face of SARS and Other 
Infectious Diseases, REASON, Aug. 1, 2003, at 33. 
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isolation in the context of leprosy.59  Its primary function is to combat contagious 
disease, and countries across the globe have used it, in varying degrees of severity, as 
a method of self-preservation.  In the fifteenth century, for example, the British 
government used quarantines to fight the bubonic plague.60  Likewise, at various 
times in history, both Bedloe’s and Ellis Islands of New York were sites of 
quarantines.61 
Despite their widespread use, quarantines are controversial because of their 
intrusion into valued individual rights.  Quarantines not only impact general liberty, 
by hindering the freedom of mobility within society, but also personal autonomy, by 
substituting the judgment of public health officials, acting as an extension of the 
government, for that of individuals.62  Moreover, such measures tend to breed fear 
and blame among the people in a community, frequently leading to the unjust 
shunning of marginalized individuals and unpopular social groups.63  Overreaction, 
particularly when it is prejudicial, is a daunting area of concern for those questioning 
the propriety of such measures in a democratic society.64  On the other hand, “having 
the ability to act forcefully to stop an epidemic could prove indispensable”65 to 
saving people’s lives and preserving the social infrastructure necessary for 
maintaining public order.  And while limiting a person’s freedom of movement, for 
example, should not be taken lightly, there do not seem to be many alternatives in the 
case of highly infectious communicable diseases.66 
While the public’s view of quarantines seems mixed following 9/11, which 
confirmed the possibility of future bio-terrorism, quarantines have historically 
engendered significant resistance and controversy.67  Moreover, unlike many Asian 
countries like Singapore and China, where the governments are authoritarian and the 
expectation of civil liberties is much lower, quarantines have never been widely used 
in the United States.68  Renewed consideration of this measure, therefore, raises a 
                                                                
59Leviticus 13:4 (King James). 
60McCullagh, supra note 58. 
61Id. 
62POWER, supra note 2, at 219. 
63Id. at 208.  In 1892, the New York City Port Authority quarantined a ship of immigrants 
from Europe by forcing poor passengers to remain sequestered below the deck in unsanitary 
conditions.  Fifty-eight of the sequestered passengers perished on the vessel. Marlantes, supra 
note 9. 
64McCullagh, supra note 58. 
65Stephen Smith, US Allows for SARS Quarantines Health Officials Say None are Planned 
Yet, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 2003, at A2. 
66McCullagh, supra note 58. 
67Marlantes, supra note 9. 
68
“Although quarantines have been applied on occasion in limited circumstances, broad 
quarantines have never been used in the United States . . . . ” Lorena Matei, Quarantine 
Revision and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: “Laws for the Common Good,” 
18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 433, 435 (2002). 
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host of “political and ethical questions in a mobile society”69 that extend beyond 
intrusions into civil liberties.  These deserve attention before any significant policy 
decisions are made.70 
B.  Mandatory Screening and Immunization 
“Laws mandating immunization first appeared [in the United States] in the early 
nineteenth century.”71  Like quarantines, mandatory immunizations are aimed at 
combating infectious disease, only through prevention.  Vaccinations are currently 
among the most cost-effective and widely used preventive measures against 
disease.72  Similarly, “[d]isease screening is one of the most basic tools of modern 
public health and preventive medicine . . . [with] a long and distinguished history in 
efforts to control epidemics of infectious diseases and targeting treatment for chronic 
diseases.”73  Screening involves the medical testing of a defined population, and is 
undertaken for broader public health purposes than mere diagnosis.74  Despite their 
utility, both of these public health measures, immunization and screening, have long 
sparked popular resistance and controversy from the public, with attitudes ranging 
from sharp suspicion to appreciative enthusiasm.75 
The root of the discord stems from the underlying observation that “[t]he power 
of government to compel individuals to receive approved materials into their bodies 
and to surrender materials from their bodies is necessary from a public health 
perspective, and necessarily objectionable from a civil liberties perspective.”76  Both 
of these interventions, mandatory immunization and screening, impact rights to 
personal autonomy and privacy; however, they also provide a tremendous benefit. 
With respect to immunization, using it as a form of prevention is almost always 
less costly, physically as well as financially, than treating an illness on a case-by-
case basis after it develops and has the opportunity to spread.  This is particularly 
                                                                
69Id. 
70While a quarantine is inherently intrusive, there are ways of limiting the extent of its 
intrusion into civil liberties by regulating aspects of its scope and length. 
71POWER, supra note 2, at 181. 
72Id. at 180.  Just last year, the state of Illinois added chickenpox to its list of required 
immunizations for children in school and/or daycare, bringing the total number of required 
vaccinations to nine. See Kevin McDermott, Chickenpox Vaccine Will be Required; Children 
Entering Kindergarten or Day Care are Affected, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 11, 2002, at 
B1. 
73POWER, supra note 2, at 187 (quoting the INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 2). 
74Id. at 188. 
75See Marlantes, supra note 9 for commentary identifying some of the greatest successes 
and failures in the history of immunizations.  One of the most prominent recent illustrations of 
this resistance was the public’s reaction to President Bush’s smallpox vaccination program.  
“Although the federal government . . . shipped 274,000 doses of vaccine to states since the 
program began Jan. 24, 2003 hundreds of hospitals, a half-dozen major unions and even some 
public health departments . . . refused to participate . . . . [T]he vast majority of medical 
professions remain[ed] unconvinced that the threat of a smallpox attack [was] serious enough 
to administer a vaccine known for its serious side effects.” Connolly, supra note 44. 
76Dickens, supra note 22, at 167. 
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true for ailments, such as chickenpox, which are very common and tend to be 
concentrated in a certain segment of the population.77  On the other hand, forcibly 
injecting a pathogen into one’s body is a very intimate form of bodily intrusion that 
is frequently objectionable from a religious, as well as a privacy, standpoint.  
Additionally, the measure involves a level of risk that, in some cases, could be 
considerable, and may result in major bodily harm and/or even death.78  While there 
is no guaranteed constitutional protection against this, it is becoming less of an issue 
as all state immunization laws now excuse children who are known to be more 
susceptible to having an adverse reaction, and most states make exceptions for those 
articulating sincere religious objections.79 
Mandatory screening, for its part, also plays an important role in promoting 
public health.  Modern public health is grounded in the scientific foundation of 
epidemiology, which, in turn, is based on studies of the prevalence and character of 
disease in various populations.  The primary justification for such an intrusive 
measure is society’s interest in health and safety.80  However, the benefits of 
screening depend on several variables, which include, among other things, the 
reliability of the particular test and the frequency of its false positive results.81  These 
must be weighed against some of the primary objections, which include a veritable 
violation of bodily integrity and privacy, as well as possible stigmatization.82   
C.  Health Information Sharing 
“[T]he amount of personal medical information that is routinely disclosed [in 
American society] has become enormous.”83  Such records invariably contain 
sensitive information concerning everything from a person’s behavior and genetic 
                                                                
77The underlying impetus for mandatory immunization is really an externality principle.  It 
is not as much for the individual child’s benefit (though this is also a consideration), as it is for 
the broader public good.  When children are vaccinated, it provides great benefits to all those 
they come into contact with.  This is a positive externality. 
78In 1954, a faulty batch of the new polio vaccine resulted in the paralysis of 200 hundred 
young children.  Marlantes, supra note 9. 
79POWER, supra note 2, at 181.  This illustrates one way in which the government has 
struck a balance between this particular public health intrusion and civil liberties. 
80See id. at 196.  The knowledge obtained from screenings helps to educate officials about 
the characteristics and transmission of a given disease.  This, in turn, aids officials in 
developing preventive strategies. 
81See id. at 189. 
82See id. at 188.  This issue is particularly salient with respect to HIV screening of 
newborns since “determining the HIV status of [a] newborn automatically establishes the HIV 
status of the mother.” Linda Farber Post, Note, Unblinded Mandatory HIV Screening of 
Newborns: Care or Coercion?, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 169, 173 (1994).  As with all public 
health measures, however, there are ways of minimizing the level of intrusiveness by 
adopting, for example, strict privacy guidelines regulating the use and dispersion of such 
information. 
83Eric Wymore, It’s 1998, Do You Know Where Your Medical Records Are? Medical 
Record Privacy After the Implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 553, 554 (1998). 
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profile to their socio-economic status.84  This free flow of information has many 
positive aspects.  From a public health perspective, information concerning 
demographics, public benefit eligibility, current health status, and lifestyle choices is 
all very helpful for developing strategies to promote public health.85  Additionally, 
access by insurers helps them to combat fraud in the industry and access by 
employers can help to ensure “the accommodation and safety of workers, as required 
by the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act.”86  On the other hand, health information sharing also has very serious privacy 
implications, and privacy seems to be an issue of some concern to the American 
people. 
In 1996, the public’s interest in the privacy of health information prompted the 
government to enact the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), which was intended to facilitate access to health insurance and combat 
fraud in the health care industry while establishing more stringent privacy safeguards 
to protect electronic exchanges of health information.87  Then in 1999, a Wall Street 
Journal poll revealed that the issue most feared by Americans in the upcoming 
century was “erosion of personal privacy.”88  It received twenty-nine percent of the 
vote with no other issue scoring more than twenty-three percent.89  While the 
September 11th attacks on America shifted that focus somewhat, it remains an issue 
of concern.90  And there is some indication that this concern over privacy may not be 
unfounded.  Public health officials have admitted that HIPAA has loopholes,91 and 
many hospitals simply do not have sufficient safeguards in place to guarantee 
privacy.92  Moreover, mishandling confidential medical information could have dire 
consequences for individuals, which range from embarrassment and loss of self-
esteem to loss of employment and/or insurance.93  Striking a balance is a delicate 
procedure that is very tough to do. 
                                                                
84POWER, supra note 2, at 131. 
85Id.  Names-based AIDS reporting is one example of a successful health information 
sharing campaign that helped to determine the disease’s cause and effect on those affected. 
Names Debate, supra note 25, at 698. 
86Wymore, supra note 83, at 555. 
87See id. at 566-73 for a more detailed discussion of HIPAA. 
88Peter P. Swire & Lauren B. Steinfeld, Security and Privacy After September 11: The 
Health Care Example, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1515 (2002). 
89Id. 
90See id. at 1515-516. 
91Among some of the exceptions to the rule for patient permission before disclosure of 
medical records are national priorities purposes, national emergencies, and compliance with 
court orders. See id. at 1530-533. 
92Avram Goldstein, A Behind-the-Scenes Force for Privacy; For Leader of D.C.-Based 
Project, Protecting Confidentiality of Medical Records is ‘Lifelong Endeavor,’ WASH. POST, 
Apr. 28, 2003, at A21. 
93POWER, supra note 2, at 131. 
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Reviewing the tensions between public health and civil liberties inherent in 
quarantines, mandatory screening and immunization, and health information sharing, 
makes it clear that there is much to consider when balancing these values.  It is 
difficult to predict how the American public would react to the implementation of 
these measures, with much depending on the context of the situation.  On the one 
hand, there are many historical examples of Americans sacrificing for the greater 
good in times of war, for example.94  Similarly, there are many limitations on 
individual rights that society has agreed to enforce in the name of public health, such 
as seat belt requirements.95  On the other hand, “overreaction is [always] a threat 
whenever governments face an apparent crisis;”96 authority can be carefully used or 
wildly abused.97  Additionally, the American public is living in an age of 
increasingly extensive civil liberties and is much more willing to challenge attempts 
at curtailing these freedoms.  To be effective, a public health system would have to 
appreciate these realities. 
IV.  THE UNITED STATES’ METHOD OF HANDLING THESE TENSIONS 
Recognizing the trade-offs inherent in various public health measures, it is useful 
to examine how the United States has handled these tensions by reviewing 
legislation arising out of several of the most dire public health crises in recent years, 
namely: (1) the HIV/AIDS pandemic, (2) 9/11, and (3) SARS. 
A.  HIV/AIDS 
Legislation arising out of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which is targeted at stopping 
its spread, has taken on several forms including case reporting, partner notification, 
and criminal penalties for knowingly exposing others to the virus.98  While each of 
these plays a part in the fight against HIV/AIDS in many states, efforts have 
concentrated primarily on case reporting, which involves monitoring individuals 
infected with the disease.99  Whereas AIDS reporting received widespread support, 
even from the infected community, from the moment of its implementation, HIV 
                                                                
94Col. Thomas W. McShane, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Security, 23-DEC PA. LAW. 
46, 46 (2001).  This was particularly true during World War II and the Cold War. 
95Georges Benjamin, Wilfredo Lopez & Angela Zoe Monson, Partners in Public Health 
Law: Elected Officials, Health Directors, and Attorneys, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 17, 21 (2002).  
Other limitations include motorcycle helmet wearing requirements and no smoking laws. Id. 
96McCullagh, supra note 58. 
97Id.  This potential for overreaction was realized during the recent anthrax scare when 
several female employees of Michigan State University “were made to strip naked and stand 
in a plastic wading pool to be decontaminated with a chlorine-bleach solution” after receiving 
a suspicious letter. Marlantes, supra note 9. 
98Mark Hansen, Can the Law Stop AIDS? Through Penalties and Reporting Requirements, 
Lawmakers Appear Determined to Regulate the Disease Out of Existence, 84 A.B.A.J. 26 
(1998). 
99Id.  HIV reporting is very similar in process to AIDS reporting.  It involves physicians 
and laboratories reporting evidence of HIV infection to local health officials who then forward 
that information to the Centers for Disease Control.  Names Debate, supra note 25, at 706. 
2003-04] AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC HEALTH 187 
positive status reporting was met with considerable resistance.100  This is largely due 
to the stigma attached to the designation of “HIV positive” that stays with often non-
symptomatic infected individuals for the rest of their lives, which, with modern 
treatment techniques, could be quite long.101  Legislation mandating HIV reporting is 
now widespread102 and enjoys broad-based support,103 with the only real debate 
centered on whether reporting should be names-based or done through a code 
system.104 
As exemplified by the HIV/AIDS legislation, the United States Government 
responded to this threat by striking the balance on the side of greater governmental 
intervention.  It considered the benefits of HIV surveillance, which include 
assistance in targeting preventive services and facilitating access to counseling, 
education, treatment, and voluntary partner notification services early-on,105 to 
outweigh the adverse effects of potential stigmatization if a leak of information were 
to occur.  However, the government has not fully heeded United States 
Representative Thomas Coburn’s (R-OK) admonition that “it is time to stop treating 
AIDS like a civil rights issue and start treating it like the public health crisis that it 
is.”106  The government’s recognition of victims’ interest in privacy is the motivating 
factor behind its efforts to explore alternative options to the names-based reporting 
system that is now in place throughout most of the country.107 
B.  9/11 
On October 26, 2001, less than six weeks after the devastating events of 
September 11th, President George W. Bush signed into law the USA Patriot Act, 
which was designed to increase governmental powers of investigation and 
enforcement so as to combat all modes of terrorism, including bio-terrorism.108  
“[T]he USA Patriot Act [is], by all measures, one of the most sweeping and 
                                                                
100Names Debate, supra note 25, at 696-97. 
101See id. at 698-99. 
102Id. at 705.  “[A] majority of states have [now] implemented HIV reporting.” Id. 
103Hansen, supra note 98. 
104Names Debate, supra note 25, at 736-37. 
105Id. at 714-15. 
106Hansen, supra note 98.  In fact, Rep. Thomas Coburn has advocated a bill permitting, 
among other things, doctors and funeral homes to deny treatment to patients who are not tested 
first, and requiring sex offenders to be tested within forty-eight hours of formally being 
charged with a crime. Id. 
107Despite its original promise as an alternative, the non-named unique identifier code 
system that has been implemented in several states has proven to be more costly and less 
effective than the names-based system.  According to a study promulgated by the states of 
Maryland and Texas along with the Centers for Disease Control, the code system had “low 
rates of completeness in reporting, . . . difficulty in conducting follow-up on specific cases, 
and the absence of behavioral risk data.” Names Debate, supra note 25, at 740. 
108Lisa Finnegan Abdolian & Harold Takooshian, The USA Patriot Act: Civil Liberties, 
the Media, and Public Opinion, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1429, 1429 (2003). 
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controversial acts in United States history.”109  Its provisions include, among other 
things, increased surveillance and wiretap authority, greater sharing of intelligence 
among independent agencies, diminished due process for immigrants, and criminal 
sanctions for the new crime of domestic terrorism.110  With respect to public health 
specifically, it calls for an expansion of information sharing to facilitate a response to 
bio-terror attacks, a grant program to support preparedness, upgrading surveillance 
epidemiology, improving public health laboratories, and enhancing training of 
healthcare professionals likely to be the first responders to bio-terrorist ploys.111  It 
was passed by an overwhelming majority of the federal government and without 
public debate at a time where “even a member of Congress would provoke cries of 
heresy by questioning the President’s request for additional powers to catch the evil-
doers.”112 
The Patriot Act unequivocally tips the scales in favor of governmental power and 
intervention, “many would argue at the expense of individual liberties.”113  
Nevertheless, despite the ease with which elected officials allowed provisions 
formally declared by Congress to be too pro-surveillance to become law,114 the 
American public is not yet ready to treat the Constitution like a rough draft.115  It is 
true that there is mixed public sentiment over the sacrifice of individual liberties for 
national security, as there generally is with respect to any topic of major concern;116 
however, “[o]rganizations across the political spectrum, from village councils to 
national advocacy groups, are [increasingly] going on record opposing this newest 
potential assault on Americans’ civil liberties.”117  Some of the most controversial 
surveillance provisions of the Act were set to sunset in 2004.118  The key was to 
replace these provisions with less extreme measures focused on the common 
objectives of security and privacy, which were not necessarily antagonistic.119 
                                                                
109Id. 
110Id. at 1430-431.  The definition of domestic terrorism includes “dangerous acts that 
‘appear to be intended . . . to influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion.’” 
Id. at 1430 (quoting from USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 
376 (2001)). 
111USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001). 
112Abdolian & Takooshian, supra note 108, at 1437. 
113Id. at 1429. 
114Swire & Steinfeld, supra note 88, at 1516. 
115William E. Gibson, The Key to America’s Security: Should the United States Adopt 
Israel’s Aggressive Approach to Ensure Homeland Security?, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 2003, 
at 1F. 
116As an example of the extent of mixed feelings, while some members of Congress are 
rallying for greater protection of civil liberties, others have suggested modeling the United 
States’ national security policy after Israel’s system, which takes an aggressive approach 
toward terrorism.  See id. 
117Matt Larson, Strange Bedfellows: What the ACLU and the NRA Have in Common, INST. 
FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, Sept. 1, 2003, at 6. 
118Swire & Steinfeld, supra note 88, at 1517. 
119See id. at 1523. 
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C.  SARS 
On April 4, 2003, “President Bush signed an executive order . . . allowing health 
authorities to forcibly quarantine people potentially infected with severe acute 
respiratory syndrome [SARS], the mystery ailment that killed at least 84 people and 
infected more than 2,300 on five continents since it first appeared in China during 
November, 2002.”120  It has been two decades since the nation’s list of infectious 
diseases justifying forcible quarantine was last amended;121 “almost all quarantines in 
recent decades had been voluntary.”122  Violations of the order carry the penalty of a 
fine of up to $1000 and one year in prison.123  While public health officials clearly 
have the authority to quarantine, none are anticipated in the immediate future.124 
Allowing forcible quarantines certainly gives the government tremendous power 
at the expense of personal autonomy.  As discussed earlier,125 such a broad grant 
presents dangers of civil liberties violations particularly where, as here, the disease 
seems primarily concentrated in a particular subset of the population.126  However, 
the legislative response may not be as unbalanced as it superficially may appear 
considering SARS is a veritable weapon of mass destruction.127  After all, “[i]t only 
takes one individual not complying to cause a real problem.”128  But it certainly lacks 
the specificity of guidelines that is necessary to safeguard against civil liberties 
violations. 
V.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THESE TENSIONS 
As a whole, the U.S. government’s reaction to each of the recent public health 
threats was to augment its authority to take measures entailing the sacrifice of 
individual freedoms.  This was accomplished reactively, in piecemeal fashion, as a 
response to whatever threat was endangering the public’s health at a specific time.  
Notably, several of these measures provided the officials charged with enforcing 
                                                                
120Smith, supra note 65. 
121Id.  Other diseases on the list include cholera and the plague. See Exec. Order No. 
13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255, 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003). 
122Smith, supra note 65. 
123McCullagh, supra note 58. 
124Smith, supra note 65.  “Public health experts are in wide agreement that U.S. officials 
would always attempt voluntary isolation and quarantine” in the first instance. Ceci Connolly, 
Laws Not Up to SARS Epidemic: Quarantining the Infected and the Exposed May Trample 
Civil Liberties, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 26, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter, Civil Liberties]. 
125See Part III.A, supra. 
126I do not mean to suggest that the Asian population is more susceptible to SARS, only 
that they are more likely to be discriminated against because of the disease’s origination in 
Asia, and the popular impression that Asian people are more likely to be carriers, at least in 
the short term. 
127Nicholas D. Kristof, Civil Liberties? If They’re Really Sick, Lock ‘Em Up, THE 
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, May 3, 2003, at 6.  Also, health officials already quarantine 
tuberculosis patients on a regular basis.  Civil Liberties, supra note 124. 
128Civil Liberties, supra note 124. 
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them little guidance regarding their use, thereby leaving them open to the possibility 
of ready abuse.129  This course of action, with all of its benefits and faults, represents 
the way the United States has dealt with the tensions between public health and civil 
rights infringements in recent years.  Before considering ways of improving upon 
this system, it is important to recognize that there are alternative approaches, such as 
those implemented internationally by countries like Singapore and Canada, and those 
advocated by public health experts like Lawrence Gostin.  Assessing these 
alternative approaches for their efficacy in striking a balance in the face of similar 
public health threats, such as SARS, provides a useful tool with which to more 
critically evaluate the U.S. system. 
A.  Singapore: A Non-Democratic Alternative 
The nation of Singapore provides a good illustration of the general approach of 
non-democratic societies, which are not charged with the task of protecting 
individual rights, to assaults on public health.  When SARS hit the shores of 
Singapore in the spring of 2003, the government responded swiftly, definitively, and 
authoritatively.  It immediately implemented aggressive quarantines130 with 
punishments for breaking them ranging from fines to imprisonment and the threat of 
public identification.131  There was also electronic surveillance of those in isolation 
through the use of web cameras and electronic tracking bracelets.132  “SARS patients 
were allowed no visitors, and schools were closed.”133  Even foreign visitors were 
forced to pass through a thermal scanner that, depending on the reading, could result 
in their being quarantined for up to ten days.134  The government’s approach to the 
problem was dictatorial and heavy-handed, but nonetheless very honest, proactive, 
and effective for combating the disease.135 
Singapore’s “single-minded determination to take whatever steps necessary to 
stop the spread of the disease, with scant regard for such individual liberties as the 
                                                                
129In fact, there have been numerous reports of civil rights violations against detainees 
being held in New York City holding facilities in the aftermath of 9/11.  The “Justice 
Department inspector general’s report reviewing the detention . . . [found] that these 
individuals, some 760, were denied assistance of counsel, routinely denied basic information 
about why they were being held and detained excessively long – on average for three months.” 
Brandon Mayfield Case, THE JOURNAL NEWS, May 26, 2004, at 6B. 
130McCullagh, supra note 58.  After the government got word of several potential cases of 
SARS at the popular Pasir Panjang Wholesale Market, it forcibly quarantined nearly 2,000 
people who had worked at the market between April 5th and 19th.  Id. 
131Paul Jacob, Draconian? Singapore is Just Doing What it Needs to Fight SARS, STRAITS 
TIMES, May 3, 2003, at 1.  “Singapore announced that it intends to open a camp for any of the 
2,500 people under home quarantine who disobey.” Civil Liberties, supra note 124. 
132McCullagh, supra note 58. 
133Kristof, supra note 127. 
134Id. 
135Singapore has been “one of the few countries where those in charge have been quick 
and just as upfront with the bitter news as they have been with the determination to fight off 
the effects of the virus by any means necessary.” Jacob, supra note 131.  This openness and 
proactive response stands in direct contrast to China’s approach, which was wide-scale denial. 
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right to travel and associate freely . . . may have spared it the worst.”136  Despite its 
having experienced the third-worst outbreak of SARS in the world, Singapore’s 
death rate was comparably low,137 and notably lower than the less severe outbreak 
that hit North America.138  The lesson from the SARS outbreak in Singapore seems 
to be that compromising on certain civil liberties can enable more effective 
management of public health risks.139  However unpopular this lesson may be, 
particularly in a democratic nation like the United States, it presents an unmistakable 
and powerful message that should have some bearing on the shaping of United States 
policy in this regard.140 
B.  Canada: A Democratic Approach 
Canada’s reaction to SARS was very different from the authoritarian response of 
Singapore.  SARS first appeared in Toronto in February 2003 when an elderly 
Toronto woman returned from a visit to Hong Kong infected with the disease, and 
passed it on to her family.141  After several misdiagnoses and hospital transfers that 
facilitated broad exposure to the deadly illness, it was properly identified as SARS, 
prompting the government to take action.142 
By comparison to Singapore’s approach, Canada’s reaction was sluggish and 
relatively mild-mannered.  The first quarantines were voluntary in nature, though 
officials did have the authority to request police escorts for dangerous dissenters.143  
It was several weeks, if not months, after SARS hit that Canadian officials began to 
quarantine more aggressively by “cordoning off entire buildings containing infected 
patients.”144  This eventually escalated to the point where hospitals were closed and 
anyone having had contact with SARS patients was quarantined.145  Even the 
Catholic Church began stepping in and asking worshippers to “refrain from kissing 
icons, dipping their hands in holy water or sharing Communion wine.”146 
In the opinion of some medical professionals, Canada’s slow yet gradually 
intensifying response to SARS was at least partly responsible for the magnitude of 
                                                                
136McCullagh, supra note 58. 
137It was approximately fifteen percent.  Id. 
138Id. 
139Kristof, supra note 127. 
140It is important to note, however, that while an authoritarian, heavy-handed central 
government has some advantages with respect to public health because of its ability to 
disseminate information quickly and control its citizenry, it will not necessarily fare better 
than a democratic society if, for example, it decides to hide information or misrepresent it to 
the public.  Much will depend, as always, on how the power is exercised. 
141Michael D. Lemonick & Alice Park, The Truth About SARS, TIME, May 5, 2003, at 48. 
142Id. 
143Jacob, supra note 131. 
144Civil Liberties, supra note 124. 
145Phil Thomas & Lorraine Fraser, Exiles Fleeing Hong Kong ‘Pose Threat to Health in 
Britain,’ SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 6, 2003, at 17. 
146Lemonick & Park, supra note 141. 
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the infection in its country.147  This resulted in its having a higher death rate than 
some of the harder hit Asian countries.148  Another likely cause was the lack of 
communication among public health officials across the country.149  The fact that 
Canada has a federal system, like the United States, complicated matters with respect 
to coordination and communication.  This coordination, however, was not a problem 
for the centralized government of Singapore.  Overall, Canada’s approach was less 
effective in controlling the illness, but also generated little strife concerning civil 
rights violations because the infringements were made only where clearly 
necessary.150 
C.  Lawrence Gostin: The Approach of a Public Health Expert 
Lawrence Gostin, a renowned Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law 
Center and Professor of Public Health at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health, is a leading expert and one of the foremost respected voices in the area of 
public health.  Through his book, Public Health Law: Duty, Power Restraint,151 
Gostin sets forth a framework for what he envisions would be an effective public 
health system in the United States.  While a general framework does not provide the 
same benefit of detailed review as a specific strategy, it is useful for illustrating 
reasonable alternative approaches that have a chance of succeeding in the U.S. 
democratic system.   
At the heart of his book is support for model legislation that reflects the three 
principles of duty, power, and restraint.152  More specifically, Gostin asserts that such 
a law should impose affirmative obligations on government to promote health within 
the population, and give public health authorities sufficient power to regulate actions 
for the benefit of the community without permitting “overreaching in the name of 
public health.”153  In order to achieve this appropriate balance of power, Gostin 
provides an evaluative framework that can be systematically applied to all of the 
                                                                
147Civil Liberties, supra note 124.  There is some evidence that suggests that Canada’s 
initially sluggish reaction to SARS may have been influenced by policy-makers’ concern for 
the economy.  After all, “[t]ourism is the No. 1 industry worldwide, with 2001 revenues of 
more than $463 billion,” and the World Health Organization’s advisory warning against 
nonessential travel to Toronto was met with outrage.  “[Canadian officials] claimed that the 
advisory was unwarranted . . . and would ruin their already slumping tourism business.” Jill 
Schensul, SARS and the Speed of Life, TRAVEL, May 4, 2003, at 1. 
148Singapore’s death rate was only 15% whereas Canada’s was estimated at 17.5%. 
McCullaugh, supra note 58. 
149One of Toronto’s disease experts had no way of getting information about the spread of 
SARS to Canada’s national health agency after regular working hours. Rob Stein, SARS 
Exposed World’s Weak Spots: Experts Welcome Hotline for Public Health Emergencies, New 
Powers for WHO, WASHINGTON POST, June 15, 2003, at A27. 
150Another problem associated with the difficulty of communication was the reluctance of 
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152September 11th, supra note 14, at 801. 
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various sources of public health threats.  It involves the following five steps: (1) 
identifying existing public health risks, (2) demonstrating a particular public health 
measure’s effectiveness at reducing the risk, (3) assessing the economic costs of such 
an endeavor, (4) similarly assessing the degree of burden it would impose on 
individuals, and (5) weighing these two to assess the overall fairness of the policy.154 
Overall, Gostin’s approach seems to advocate “a carefully constrained and 
narrowly delineated interventionist role for government” whenever intervention and 
civil liberties come into conflict.155  He does not think that public health and 
individual rights can always coexist.156  On the other hand, he also contends that the 
exercise of civil liberties is only possible with security;157 therefore, almost 
paradoxically, some sacrifice of liberty must be made in order to gain it.  After all, 
“individuals, acting alone, cannot safeguard their own health and safety, even with 
full access to the sophisticated technologies of modern science and medicine.”158  In 
light of this, Gostin proposes that the relevant question is not “whether liberty-
limiting power is ever legitimate . . . [but] what circumstance must exist to justify [a 
particular] level of [governmental] authority.”159  While Gostin may not specifically 
delineate where society should draw the line to balance these often opposing forces, 
he advocates, at the very least, a process with greater consistency and detail in 
approach than what the U.S. system has thus far exemplified, particularly in recent 
years.160 
VI.  A FOURTH ALTERNATIVE: THE MODEL STATE  
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 
Yet another alternative to the U.S. system that responded to the threats of 
HIV/AIDS, 9/11, and SARS is embodied in model legislation called the Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA).  This model bill was drafted in the Fall 
of 2001 by the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns 
Hopkins Universities in response to 9/11.161  Because of some perceived ambiguity in 
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158Id. at 793. 
159Lawrence O. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations On 
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160See Julia F. Costich, Lawrence Gostin’s Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 90 
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the scope of the Commerce Clause, as compared to states’ police power, it was 
drafted as a state bill, and incorporates some of Gostin’s theory because he 
contributed greatly to its drafting.162  Moreover, it signals the first major shift in U.S. 
public health policy away from the sickness model of health and toward 
preparedness. 
Very generally, MSEHPA “provides a modern framework for effective 
identification and response to emerging health threats.”163  It is not meant to be 
adopted in draft form by every state but, instead, is intended to be used as a 
template.164  Any state adopting some version of this model legislation would assume 
the responsibility of safeguarding its citizens’ public health and security, and 
providing the tools with which to accomplish it.165  Among the powers that it grants 
to officials in times of health crises are the power to declare a public health 
emergency, the power to quarantine without a court order, the power to take and/or 
condemn property as needed for the care and treatment of individuals, and the power 
to force health workers to help out or risk losing their licenses.166 
While these are very expansive grants of authority, they are not exercised in a 
vacuum.  The model act is also concerned with the protection of civil liberties.167  A 
more detailed review of some of its main provisions reveals how it strikes a balance 
between the breadth of these powers and individual rights. 
First, while a state governor has full and sole discretion to declare a state of 
emergency, which triggers a host of other powers,168 the designation automatically 
terminates after thirty days unless specifically renewed, and can be overruled by a 
majority vote in both chambers of a state’s legislature.169  Second, to issue a 
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“The effect of a declaration of a public health emergency is great.  Once an emergency 
is declared, the disaster response mechanisms . . . are activated . . . [and] [t]he governor has 
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quarantine, a written, ex parte court order authorizing it must be obtained beforehand 
unless “a delay . . . would pose an immediate threat to the public health.”170  
However, even in cases where a delay is dangerous, a court order must be obtained 
within ten days afterward.171  Third, with respect to confiscation of property for the 
good of public health, MSEHPA requires the state to “pay ‘just compensation’ to the 
owners of any facilities or materials that are lawfully taken or appropriated by a 
public health authority for its temporary or permanent use during a state of public 
health emergency.”172  Finally, although the public health authority has the power to 
forcibly elicit the help of healthcare providers and negotiate their rates with the threat 
of otherwise revoking their medical licenses, it balances this intrusion by holding 
them harmless from liability except in cases of gross negligence or willful 
misconduct.173 
MSEHPA has many other provisions that, in similar fashion, attempt to balance 
the more expansive authority of the government for protecting the public’s health 
with more detailed measures guarding individual rights.  “[V]irtually every state has 
used MSEHPA as a checklist of powers…for responding to . . . public health 
emergencies . . . . [and] [a]t least 20 . . . have adopted the Model Act in whole or in 
part.”174  However, the model legislation has also generated much controversy, with 
some of the nation’s largest and most influential states, namely: California, New 
York, and Texas, all spurning it.175  This controversy is testament that, while 
MSEHPA is invaluable for its identification of the difficult trade-offs inherent in 
public health, if not for its overall approach to the problem in the United States, there 
is room for improvement. 
VII.  SOME REFLECTIONS ON POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO MSEHPA 
In Chinese, the word “crisis” is comprised of two symbols: danger and 
opportunity.176  Applying this logic to the MSEHPA, the model legislation aimed at 
public health crises, every weakness identified in the act is an opportunity for 
improvement.  Therefore, the best way to expand upon the solid foundation of the act 
is to review and address its greatest criticisms. 
One of the most dangerous and troubling aspects of the legislation is its 
ambiguity in explaining some of the most controversial grants of authority, like the 
ability to quarantine.177  Language such as “[t]he public health authority may . . . 
establish and maintain places of isolation and quarantine, and set rules and make 
orders . . . . [f]ailure to obey these rules, orders, or provisions shall constitute a 
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misdemeanor,”178 does not explain how far officials should go in keeping people out 
of the quarantined area, if parents could be kept from children,179 or any other 
practical details about the provision’s implementation that might better guard against 
abuses.  Another problem is the lack of recourse for the public against public health 
officials in times of crisis except under extreme circumstances,180 i.e. in cases of 
“gross negligence” or “willful misconduct”, both of which are high thresholds.181  
This point is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that individuals may be 
forcibly receiving medical treatment they do not want.  Yet another weakness in the 
legislation is that it hinges upon an identification and declaration of a public health 
emergency.  However, this “establishes an artificial distinction between the 
functioning of the public health system during a bio-terrorist attack and the day-to-
day functioning of the system,182 because public health crises do not often involve a 
single cataclysmic event.183  Instead, the early stages of a crisis, like a bio-terrorist 
attack, “mimic fairly ordinary public health situations in which illnesses that initially 
seem routine strike a small number of people.”184 
Accordingly, attempts at more effective and enduring reform should begin with a 
framework for addressing these problematic issues.  One of the best ways to resolve 
the problem of ambiguity is to provide a set of guidelines, like those accompanying 
the tax code, to better explain the provisions of the model law in their application to 
various life situations.  While states can choose to accept, reject, or modify 
provisions according to their own constitutions, the guidelines should be a national 
instrument that provides the public with some semblance of uniformity and 
reasonable expectations a standard that could serve as a point of comparison when 
investigating potential abuses of power.  Additionally, choosing one public health 
threat, such as a bio-terror attack for example, and examining its implications on 
each of the Model Act’s provisions would be useful as a general gauge of what to 
expect and what measures are unreasonable in light of the severity of the threat. 
With respect to the problem of liability, would it be better to promote a sense of 
fairness and accountability by lowering the threshold, with some qualifications, to 
bring it in line with peacetime notions of legal actionability?  Instead of drawing the 
line at gross negligence, what if MSEHPA should allow suits for negligence that 
would exist absent a public health emergency?  Lawsuits for negligence should only 
be promulgated against individual officials if they are working in their areas of 
expertise and should take into account the exigencies of a public health emergency.  
Otherwise, if healthcare providers are being forced to temporarily provide medical 
services outside their areas of expertise due to the exigencies of the emergency and 
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negligent harm results, liability should be directed toward the government.185  For 
example, a medical lab technician who is asked to administer vaccines during a 
public health crisis and who would not otherwise be working in such a capacity but 
for the government’s request, should not be held individually liable for negligent 
vaccine administration.  Instead, liability should rest with the government.  This 
guarantees medical professionals some degree of protection, which, in turn, would 
likely make healthcare providers more willing to help out, while also ensuring some 
form of accountability to the public, which “is indispensable for engendering and 
sustaining public trust, as well as for expressing justice.”186 
Finally, a good way to approach the problem of delayed public health responses 
in the absence of cataclysmic events that trigger a state of emergency declaration is 
to restructure the provision.  Since health officials are the most likely to detect a 
public health threat, and in the best position to contain one, they should have certain 
of the emergency powers, like the authority to quarantine, for example, in the first 
instance.  Within forty-eight hours of exercising such powers, the health officials 
should have to justify their actions to an appointed commission and the governor,187 
who would then either release the individuals and investigate the actions taken, or 
declare a public health emergency.  Abuses could be curbed through publicity for 
incorrect decisions and professional consequences for officials who should have 
known better.  Governors would have the incentive to review potential threats 
immediately,188 and the longest infringement on personal autonomy without a priori 
review, would be forty-eight hours. 
In addition to improving upon these identified weaknesses, there are several other 
strategic steps that would likely strengthen the public health system.  The first is to 
have a nationwide or, if feasible, international notification system for public health 
emergencies.  Logistically, such a system could operate via an on-line bulletin board 
that every health official would be obligated to check on an hourly basis.  Details 
about a public health threat, both medical and demographic, would be posted on the 
computer, as well as the medical facility of origination, so that practitioners with 
questions could obtain more information.  The purpose of such a system would be to 
disburse information about a public health threat to the largest number of health 
officials in the shortest amount of time possible.  It would greatly facilitate 
preparedness, as well as a quick and coordinated national and international response 
to the particular threat.189 
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The second stratagem is an education campaign instructing the public on how the 
public health response system operates, and what mechanisms are in place for their 
protection.  This would put any misgivings they might have about civil rights 
infringements in the broader context of protecting public welfare.  Moreover, the 
openness of the government with respect to its plan of action would help to maintain 
public trust, which is “central to controlling any outbreak.”190  After all, “it takes a 
society - an informed and educated society - to practice public health.”191  In the end, 
the public’s belief in the fairness of the system will go a long way, and could change 
their view of objectionable provisions from being unjust assaults on civil liberties to 
mere differences of opinion. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
As the United States moves forward in this new millennium, it is likely to 
encounter many more public health threats than those faced in recent decades.  
However daunting these assaults may be, the key to an effective response is 
preparedness.  While security almost invariably comes at a price, Americans 
historically have been willing to accept reasonable restraints on liberty so long as 
they were accompanied by a well-articulated need and a general consensus for 
action.192  Using the lessons learned from recent threats to educate the public about 
the importance of preventive initiatives for potentially less visible threats in the 
future is an essential part of developing a more effective public health system.  The 
suggestions for preparedness outlined in this paper, which include education and 
public accountability, are a definite though not decisive step in the direction of 
balancing the scale of individual rights and public protection. 
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